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CURRENT DECISIONS
part of a church-related school. Secular aid is permissible only if govern-
ment is not overly involved with religion.
Although the new concept of excessive entanglement is more clearly
defined in Lemon the Court has not provided adequate guidelines against
which the many remaining questions may be judged.2 Government is
heavily entangled with religious schools in such areas as lunch programs,
medical clinics, teacher certification, textbook loans, and transportation.
These forms of secular assistance involve government with religion, yet
not excessively The reasons why this is so are obscure. Furthermore,
the line dividing permissible from impermissible entanglement is un-
clear. To clarify an area of the law that is fast becoming as muddled
as a Serbian bog the Court should abandon the doctrine of excessive
entanglement and rely, instead, upon Schempp and Allen. Aid to the
secular portion of a religious school should be permissible so long as
the purpose or primary effect of the aid program does not directly
advance religious teaching.
STEPHAN J. BOARDMAN
Constitutional Law-CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST APPLIED
TO OVERBROAD 'UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY STATUTE. Owens v. Common-
wealth, 211 Va. 633, 179 S.E.2d 477 (1971)
The appellants, members of an unruly crowd who ignored a police
order to disperse, were convicted of the statutory offense of remaining
at the place of an unlawful assembly after having been lawfully warned
to disperse.' On appeal, they claimed that the statute was an impernus-
sible infringement upon their first amendment right "peaceably to as-
semble." 2
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed, holding that the
26. Whether a particular program, such as the "voucher" plan, results in excessive
entanglement can only be determined on a case-by-case analysis. In Lemon, the Court
examned "the character and purposes of the istutons which [were] benefited, the
nature of the aid that the state provide[d], and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority" 91 S. Ct. at 2112. Other factors examined
were whether the program was innovative, self-perpetuating and self-expanding. Id. at
2117
1. VA. CoDE ANN. 18.1-254.4 (Supp. 1971)- "Remaining at a place of riot, rout, or
unlawful assembly after warning to disperse.-Every person except public officers and
persons assisting them, remaining present at the place of any riot, rout, or unlawful
assembly after having been lawfully warned to disperse, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. L "Congress shall make no law . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble . .. "
1971]
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statutory definition of unlawful assembly3 was unconstitutional since
it tended to include activities protected by the first amendment without
requiring a clear and present danger of violent conduct.4 The statute,
in effect, made unlawful the assembly of persons 'entertaining the mere
intent to engage in violent conduct, even when force and violence or
the means to effect them were absent.5
The Owens court was required to balance the regulatory powers of
the state against the first amendment right of peaceable assembly This
balancing process called for the application of two constitutional prin-
ciples: the "clear and present danger" doctrine and the concept of
"overbreadth." The former was first postulated in Schenck v. Umted
States' and elucidated by Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States:7
It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to
bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where private rights [of other individuals]
are not concerned.8
After some twenty years in judicial limbo, the doctrine was rem-
carnated in the 1940s, culminating in Termimello v. Chicago 9 The
3. VA. Coxa ANN. 18.1-254.1(c) (Supp. 1971) defines unlawful assembly- "When-
ever three or more persons assemble with the common intent or with means and prepara-
tons to do an unlawful act which would be rot if actually committed, but do not act
toward the cominussion thereof, or whenever three or more persons assemble without
authority of law and for the purpose of disturbing the peace or exciting public alarm
or disorder, such assembly is an unlawful assembly" See generally Note, Virginia's
Legislative Response to Riots, 54 VA. L. RFv. 1031, 1048 (1968), wluch suggests that the
Virgima statute might be successfully challenged.
4. Owens v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 633, 179 S.E.2d 477, 481 (1971)
5. 179 S.E.2d at 479.
6. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The Court was concerned with conspirators commtting
seditious acts by mailing printed circulars in violation of the Espionage Act of 1917"
'The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire m a theatre and causing a panic The question in every case is
whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 52. See 45 J. URBAN L. 474 (1967).
7. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
8. Id. at 628.
9. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). The Court agreed to the applicability of the test to the validity
of a conviction of a clergyman for a virulent address in an auditorium before hundreds
of people, protested by an equal number gathered outside. A prior case illustrative of
the Holmes formula is Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), where the Court held
that petitioner's first amendment rights were restricted beyond the state's power to
do so as no immediate clear and present danger was shown by an address to a peaceful
audience, regardless of the fact that the petitioner had failed to obtain a pernut. See
also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), where the plaitiff's rights were
held violated by a statute requiring a license to solicit money for religious organizations
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Termniello Court explained that proper application of the doctrine
resulted in a narrowly-drawn standard which would preserve a broad
freedom of expression.10
A retreat from this broad posture was evidenced by Dennis v. United
States" which held that words which created a high probability of
serious danger in the future could be suppressed even though no present
danger existed. The clarity which marked the Termniella version of
"clear and present danger" was forever lost, as the Court began to
vacillate between broad approval of state regulation under an mde-
pendent "balancing of interests" standard,12 and a narrow standard
based on Termniello 13
because of a lack of clear and present danger of immediate threat to public safety or
order.
10. 337 U.S. at 4. The Court held that the statute involved was an unconstitutional
limitation on the content of expression stating,
[a] function of free speech under our system of government is to mvite
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a con-
dition of unrest or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative
and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That
is why freedom of speech, though not absolute is nevertheless pro-
tected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvemence, annoyance, or unrest. There is no room under our
constitution for a more restrictive view.
11. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Court rationalizes,
Overthrow of the Government by force and violence is certainly a sub-
stantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. If, then,
this interest may be protected the literal problem which is presented is what
has been meant by the use of the phrase "clear and present danger" of the
utterances bringing about evil within the power of Congress to pumsh.
Obviously the words cannot mean that before the Government may act,
it must wait until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been
laid and the signal is awaited. If the government is aware that a group is
aiming at its overthrow, is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to
commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel
the circumstances will perm, action by the Government is required.
Id. at 509.
12. Komgsberg v. State Bar of Califorma, 366 U.S. 36, 63 (1961), where Justice Black
contended that the balancing test could be used to justify almost any government
action which nught be suppressing first amendment rights. Most commentators now
assume that the danger test includes some measure of interest balancing, but at the
same time many writers and judges consider the test an oversimplification of the need
to balance individual interests with group interest. See Barenblatt v. Umted States,
360 U.S. 109 (1959); Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger" Front Schenck
to Brandenburg and Beyond, in TiE SUPREv COURT REviEw 56-58 (P. Kurland ed.
1969).
13. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Petitioners who sang patriotic
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Most recently, in Brandenburg v. Ohio,14 the Court's approach has
merged the Tervirnello and Dennis treatment of "clear and present
danger." "Danger" must still be present, but need not be immediate
if it is "imminent." 15
The clear and present danger doctrine is intimately related to the
concept of overbreadth. If a statute is held violative of first amendment
rights for failing to exclude conduct which does not present a "clear
and present danger," the statute is overbroad. 16 Overbreadth refers to
substantive due process requirements where the prohibitive provision
may be so broad as to inhibit constitutionally protected activity 17
and religious songs in a non-violent demonstration on the state capitol grounds won a
reversal of their conviction for common law breach of the peace.
14. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dis-
sonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970).
15. The Court stated:
These later decisions [Dennis and Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957)] have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such ad-
vocacy is directed to inciting or producing mrmme-nt lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action. (Emphasis supplied)
395 US. at 447
16. One of the earliest and most oft-cited cases involving overbreadth is Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). In that case an inadequately narrowed statute pro-
hibiting picketing at certain places of business was judged to be invalid on its face. The
Court used the following language:
The very existence of a penal statute such as that here, which does not
aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control, but
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances
constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or press results in a continuous
and pervasive restriction of all freedom of discussion that might reasonably
be regarded as within its purview.
ld. at 97 Contra, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
17. Stated otherwise, "overbreadth may be conceptualized as legislative failure to
focus explicitly and narrowly on social harms which are the valid concern of govern-
ment and are the justification for interfering with expressive activities." Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 859 (1970).
The court's second holding in Owens concerned the issue of standing. There are
basically two methods of review available to the court to eliminate overbreadth. The
first is a traditional and restrained approach in which the statutory infringement on
rights is cut out case by case. The newer and more aggressive method arose from the
systematic failure of the other method of adjudication to protect first amendment
rights adequately. In employing the latter method the reviewing court asks, regardless
of the petitioner's constitutional standing: Is the statute too sweeping in its coverage?
If so, it is declared invalid on its face. This method provides a short circuit process
of eliminating unconstitutional statutes and forcing legislation; it also focuses directly
on the need for precision in drafting statutes. In short, it aims at correcting any im-
balance in interests as rapidly as possible. Id. at 844-52.
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In considering the overbreadth concept, the Court has invoked four
criteria under which a questioned statute may become a constitutionally
inpermissible regulation: 1) insufficiency of the state interest sought to
be protected;' 2) lack of objectivity and clarity in the statutory lan-
guage; 9 3) no limitation on the discretion of those responsible for en-
forcement;2 0 and 4) in penal statutes, absence of a requirement of
-knowledge or intent to obstruct a state interest.2'
In recent cases the Court has been more straightforward on the issue of standing than
in the early cases like Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 89 (1940), holding now that
appellants have standing even though their particular conduct may have been sanction-
able. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court states, "[W]e have
consistently allowed attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by
a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity We have fashioned this ex-
.ception to the rules governing standing" because of the danger of allowing a statute
susceptible to improper application to exist. 380 U.S. at 486-487 See also United States
v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S. 29 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
18. Compare Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), where petitioners were con-
victed of trespass with a malicious and mischievous intent upon the premises of the
county jail contrary to statute where it was held that the state has the power to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it was lawfully dedicated, vtb Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), where state interests did not outweigh the individual
interest.
19. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 US. 360 (1964); Comally v. General Construction Com-
pany, 269 U.S. 385 (1925). This factor is common to both the concepts of overbreadth
and vagueness. The concept of vagueness rests on the principle that procedural due
process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication. The main issues
'involved are whether the penal statute's provisions are sufficiently definite to give
reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct to those who wish to avoid its consequences
,and to apprise the judge of standards by which to determine guilt. If the language is
so obscure as to elude a man of common intelligence it is unconstitutional.
20. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), where the power of a
parade licensing board was held too broad and arbitrary
21. Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965), where a Louisiana statute regulating picketing in or near a court house "with
intent to interfere" with the admiistration of justice, was upheld as valid on its face.
There are certain lintations on this type of review. First, only those statutes which
lend themselves to numerous impermussible applications should be struck down on
their faces. This concept, which has been called the "substantial overbreadth rule,"
seems implicit in the cases and proceeds on the theory that a law which is not sub-
stantially overbroad is unlikely to have a drastic inhibitory effect. Note, supra note
17, at 918.
Interest balancing also tempers the overbreadth doctrine as it does the danger test.
In relation to overbreadth, interest balancing translates to "reasonableness." Id. at
911-13. As the Court states in Cox v. Louisiana, "It is, of course, undisputed that ap-
propriate, limited discretion under properly drawn statutes or ordinances concerning
the time, place, duration or manner of use of the streets for public assemblies may be
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The overbreadth cases illustrate a consistent demand for narrowly
drawn, precise statutory language.22  Vagueness2 and inadequacy of
statutory standards defining proscribed conduct 24 have b-een condemned.
Prior to Owens, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had but one
opportunity to consider the issues raised by the above decisions. In
York v. City of Danville25 and its companion, Thomas v. City of Dan-
vifle, 2 6 the Virginia court adhered closely to the Termintello version of
"clear and present danger," and read the word "present" quite literally
Those cases, arising prior to passage of the unlawful assembly statute,27
involved the review of a restraining order obtained by the city to prevent
violations of the disorderly conduct statute in connection with certain
demonstrations allegedly designed to upset the peace and tranquility of
the community 28 The court acknowledged the overbreadth of the re-
straining order,29 and required that it be modified. The breadth of the
statute itself, however, was not in issue.
It should come as no surprise that the Owens court, relying on its
holding in York and Thomas, struck down the unlawful assembly statute
since no requirement of "clear and present danger" appeared in the
statutory definition. The case is significant not for that ruling but for
its rigid adherence to the Terrminello definition of clear and present
danger, disavowing any concept of future or imminent danger as a
vested in administrative officials, provided that such limited discretion " is exercised
fairly and non-discriminatorily. 379 U.S. at 558.
22. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Demonstrators' convictions
for common law breach of the peace were reversed, the Court explaining that if they
had been considering "convictions resulting from the evenhanded application of a
precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that
certain specific conduct should be limited or proscribed " there might have been
a different result.
23. Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill (1969). The Court held a disorderly conduct
ordinance to be violative of constitutional rights. In his concurring opimon Mr. Justice
Black emphasized that "sweeping, dragnet statutes that may, because of vagueness,
jeopardize First Amendment freedoms cannot be used to regulate conduct. Id.
at 117-18.
24. Coates v. Cincinnati, 91 S. Ct. 1686 (1971) Petitioners were convicted under an
ordinance prohibiting three or more persons from assembling and conducting them-
selves "in a manner annoying to persons passing by
25. 207 Va. 665, 152 S.E.2d 259 (1967)
26. 207 Va. 656, 152 S.E.2d 265 (1967).
27. VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.1-254.1(c) (Supp. 1971) became effective in April 1968.
28. Thomas v. City of Danville, 207 Va. 656, 657, 152 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1967)
29. Id. at 664, 152 S.E.2d at 270.
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ground for regulation of conduct.30 Virginia is thus placed on the liber-
tarian side among courts which have construed similar statutes.31
Confronted with language which overly inhibited individual freedoms,
the Owens court demanded more specificity and narrowness so as not
to produce a chilling effect on first amendment liberties. The court
has thus placed on tie Virginia legislature the burden of adding the
element of clear and present danger in order to validate the statutory
definition of unlawful assembly 32
MICHAEL A. INMAN
30. The Brandenburg decision is not mentioned by the Owens court; rather it relied
solely upon Terminello and its Virgima progeny, which necessitated a highly critical
attitude toward state regulation of first amendment liberties.
31. Of the few state and federal courts which have considered the question, most
have closely followed the Supreme Court's guidance in regard to the danger test and
overbreadth. In Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985, 997 (N.D. Ga. 1967), the peti-
tioners challenged a dragnet type disorderly conduct statute which censured any acts
"tending to disturb the good order, morals, peace or dignity of the city' The court
held this language to be even broader than that attacked in Edwards or Ternumello. Such
condemnation of a generalized statute is in keeping with the Court's trend. A statute
requiring a parade permit for any street assemblage was similarly rejected in Baker v.
Bindner, 274 F Supp. 658, 662 (W.D. Ky 1967). The section was declared unconstitu-
tonal as it did not set a sufficient standard by which the issuer should judge qualifica-
tions. The Washington, D.C., riot statute was challenged unsuccessfully in United
States v. Jeffries, 45 F.R.D. 110, 115-18 (D.D.C. 1968), where the appellants claimed
vagueness and overbreadth. The court held the statute to be clear and precise, aimed
at punishing specific conduct, and strict enough in its requirements to pass the clear and
present danger test. These three cases illustrate an attitude as liberal as the Supreme
Court and the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals mn regard to the preservation of
individual liberties.
The following cases serve to demonstrate a contrary attitude. In 1961, the Georgia
unlawful assembly statute, which made it a msdemeanor to assemble "for the purpose of
disturbing the public peace" (emphasis supplied), was challenged for vagueness in
Wright v. Georgia, 217 Ga. 453, 122 S.E.2d 737 (1961). The Georgia court, which did
not cite any applicable Supreme Court decisions, upheld the statute contending that it
provided a clear standard in intelligible language. Id. at 741. A Califorma court upheld
that state's assembly statute in In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1966). The statute, like Virgmaa's, proscribed mere intent without requiring
clear and present danger. The court essentially ignored the overbroad language of the
statute, reasoning that the petitioners had abused their rights to the point of sacrificing
them. Id. at 335-36.
32. "It is the function of the judiciary to interpret statutes. Rewriting them is the
function of the legislature." Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 454, 459, 94 S.E.2d
537, 540 (1956)
